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Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook
The Ist-order thesis, namely, the thesis that logical consequence is standard lst-order logical consequence,1 has been widely challenged in recent decades. My own challenge to this thesis in The Bounds of Logic (and related articles2) was motivated by what I perceived to be its inade quate philosophical grounding. The bounds of logic are, in an important sense, the bounds of logical constants, yet the bounds of the standard logical constants are specified by enumeration, i.e., dogmatically, without grounding or explanation. Of course, how a given collection of objects is specified may change in the course of time, but my analysis of the role logical constants play in producing logical consequences led me to arrive at a criterion of logical constanthood whose lst-order extension far exceeds the standard selection. More specifically, I showed that if we characterize logical consequence as necessary, formal, topic neutral, indifferent to dif ferences between individuals, etc., then this characterization, restricted to languages of the lst-level, is not adequately systematized by the standard lst-order system. A richer system (or family of systems), with new logical constants, is required to fully capture it. The Bounds of Logic had as its goal a critical, systematic and con structive understanding of logic. As such it aimed at maximum neutrality vis-?-vis epistemic, metaphysical and meta-mathematical controversies.
But a conception of logic does not exist in a vacuum. Eventually our goal is to produce an account of logic that answers the needs of, contributes to the development of, and is supported by, a broader epistemology. In this paper I would like to make a first step in this direction. I will begin with an outline of a model of knowledge whose basic principles are based on the early Quine. I will identify, and offer independent justification for, the special requirements this model sets on an adequate conception of logic.
Finally, I will show how, by satisfying these requirements, the conception "Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook" by Gila Sher, The Monist, vol. 85, no. 4, pp. 555-579. Copyright ? 2002 Conceptually, the conflict arises (according to Dummett) as follows:
In accordance with [NAS] , the revision of truth-assignments to the sentences of the language which is elicited in response to a recalcitrant experience may not affect any of the peripheral sentences, but only those lying below the periphery. But, if this is so, then, it seems, experience does not impinge par ticularly at the periphery; rather, it impinges on the articulated structure . . . as a whole, not at any one particular point. In that case, it becomes difficult to see how we can any longer maintain a distinction between periphery and interior: the periphery was introduced as that part of the structure at which the impact of experience is first felt. (Dummett 1973b: 376-77) Normatively, the main tenet of NAS is the uniformity of standards of conflicts between itself (the claim made by P) and experience; revision of a central statement, C, (say, a logical statement,) is guided by its success in resolving conflicts between other statements (e.g., P) and ex perience. A peripheral statement is true due to its own direct link with reality, a central statement is true due to direct links between other state ments, namely peripheral statements, with reality. To accept or reject we set up tests concerning the objects and properties referred to by P. (In the simplest case, we check whether the observable objects referred to by have the observable properties attributed to them by P.) But to accept or reject C we consider how this would affect the overall working of the system, including its ability to handle conflicts involving peripheral state ments (like P). The standards for handling statements and theories in the periphery are factual and evidential, those for handling statements and theories in the center, pragmatic and instrumental.7
The contrast between NAS and CP is especially sharp with respect to logic: CP's conception of logic is essentially traditional, NAS's, icono clast; CP views logic as instrumental, NAS, as substantive and factual; CP regards logic as subject to pragmatic norms, NAS as subject to veridical as well as pragmatic norms.
Solution to the Conflict. My solution to the inner conflict in Quine's model (Sher 1999b ) is to replace its fixed, stationary conception of the Thus, as a peripheral discipline, logic is bound by the norms of truth and evidence, as a central discipline?by those of economy and unification.
The new model sets two substantive tasks for an adequate philoso phy of logic: (1) Explain and justify the claim that logic is world-oriented, subject to veridical standards, lies in the periphery, etc. (2) Explain and justify the claim that logic is interconnected to other branches of knowledge, plays a unificatory role in our system of knowledge, is subject to pragmatic norms, etc. In short, an adequate philosophy of logic must confront the deep questions of epistemology as they pertain to logic. In Section II I will motivate the view that logic is world-oriented from a perspective internal to the philosophy of logic. In Section III I will explain how the theory delineated in The Bounds of Logic can be regarded as a systematization (and vindication) of this view. In Section IV I will discuss one of logic's roles as a "central" discipline, namely, unification.
I will show that far from undermining the claim that logic plays a central unificatory role in science, the view that logic is world-oriented and its systematization as recounted in Section III enable us to understand why and how it plays this role.
II. Logic and the World
The view that logic is "world-oriented" is based not just on general epistemic grounds but also on considerations pertaining to logic itself. I will now present a few considerations of this kind, starting with a simple, R2. To achieve a lift effect in an airplane of type t at state st set the flaps at a large downward angle.
With 'Lr' standing for 'Flaps are set at a large downward angle', we would arrive at R2 by the following chain of reasoning: 
Logic (MP)
In fact, however, lowering the flaps to a large angle has a drag effect.
Everything else being equal, replacing one logical law by another could cause an airplane to plummet. (b) Logical consequence. Here the theory presented in The Bounds of Logic enters into our discussion. I will expound the basic principles of this theory in the next section, but briefly the answers to the above questions are: (i) The laws licensing logical inferences are formal or structural, i.e., laws governing the formal (structural) behavior of objects and structures of objects, (ii) The logical transmission of truth from a sentence (or set of sentences), Sx, to a sentence, S2, involves four basic steps: (a) identifying the logical contents of Sx and S2,l(Si) and 1(S2), respectively; (?) identi fying the formal situations described by l(5i) and 1(S2)) and 2^1(5^) and Fil(S2)), respectively; ( ) connecting F(l(Si))9 and F(1(S2)) by a formal law, and ( ) relating 52 to Sx by the relation of logical consequence.
C. The normativity of logic. Logic is a normative science and its nor mativity is greater than that of most other sciences. Physics, biology, psychology (as well as many other sciences) are all bound by the norms of logic, but logic is (for the most part) not bound by theirs.9 This unique situation places a special burden on the philosophy of logic. It is impossi ble to understand our system of knowledge without understanding the source, force and scope of the logical norms; therefore a theoretical ex planation of the normativity of logic is imperative. One of the advantages of viewing logic as world-oriented (along the lines suggested above) is the opportunity it provides of explaining the normativity of logic. A detailed account of this explanation must await the discussion in Section below, but briefly, and non-specifically, the main points are these: (i) the norma tivity of logic has its roots in the truth and lawlikeness of the laws underlying logical consequence, i.e., formal laws; (ii) the scope of the logical norms is the scope of these laws; (iii) the power of the logical norms is due to the modal status of the formal laws.
The great force and scope of the logical norms saddles us with another burden: a critical approach to logic. The main point is this: An error in most disciplines would have relatively narrow repercussions for our system of knowledge, but an error in logic would threaten the entire system. There fore, the development of critical tools for evaluating, establishing and improving the correctness of our logical theories is mandatory. Many, however, deem a critical outlook on logic to be impossible. Three popular views sharing this attitude are: (i) the view, due to the early Wittgenstein, that there is no standpoint outside logic, therefore a critical examination of logic is impossible; (ii) the conventionalist view according to which logic is conventional, hence there is no possibility of error in logic (Id*, for instance, is not erroneous but merely inconvenient), hence there is no possibility of detection or correction of error in logic; (iii) the view (wrongly The wide appeal of these views is not surprising given the prevalence of foundationalist trends in philosophy. From a foundationalist perspec tive, logic lies at the base of the epistemic hierarchy, therefore a rational critique of logic is impossible. Such a critique would require conceptual resources more basic than those of logic, but foundationalism rules out the existence of such resources. The foundationalist view, however, is prob lematic. If logic lies at the bottom of the epistemic hierarchy, then a mistake or even an omission in logic is all the more likely to have dire consequences for the whole edifice; therefore, the impossibility of a critical approach to logic is a serious cause for concern. This, in my view,
is the Achilles heel of foundationalism: The fields that, due to their position in the foundationalist hierarchy, are in greatest need of a critical underpinning, are just those that, as a matter of principle, cannot be given such an underpinning.
In contrast to the above views, the view that logical consequence is grounded in laws of objects allows the possibility of error in logic and, when combined with a holistic approach to knowledge, also the possibil ity of constructing a critical foundation for logic (a foundation not in the foundationalist sense, but in the sense of Shapiro's "foundation without foundationalism").10 An error in logic, on this view, is an error in the un derlying formal laws, and to avoid, detect, and correct such an error is to avoid, detect and correct the corresponding error in the putative formal law. To flesh out this and other points made in the last two subsections, let us now turn to the conception of logic delineated in The Bounds of Logic.
III. A Conception of Logic
In The Bounds of Logic I proposed a conception of logic whose main (i) Logical axioms and rules of inference work in the world because, and to the extent that, they are based on universal laws of formal structure, i.e., laws governing the formal behavior of objects in every formally possible state of affairs (vis-?-vis a given language). When this condition is not fulfilled, the axioms and rules may fail. Thus, Id works in the con struction of an airplane because the objects (including properties)
involved in its construction all satisfy Leibniz's Law; Id* fails in the con struction because at least some of the relevant objects (properties) do not obey the putative law corresponding to it.
(ii) Logical consequence transmits truth from premises to conclusion in a process involving four basic steps: (a) identifying the logical "skeleton" of the premises and conclusion, (?) identifying the formal sit uations described by the respective skeletons of the premises and conclusion, ( ) connecting these formal situations by means of an appro priate formal law, and ( ) concluding that it is formally necessary that if the premises are true, the conclusion is also true. Figuratively, let Sl and S2 be the premise and conclusion of a logically valid argument. Truth is transmitted from Sx to S2 as follows:
Natural Language:
it ir where t(S) is the translation of 5 into a logical language and FL is a formal law connecting Px to P2.
To see how this template is instantiated, consider the following two logical inferences:
(1) Every child deserves free education. Therefore: Every child either deserves free education or deserves a free trip to Disneyland, and (2) Some gangster is feared by most gangsters. Therefore: Most gangsters fear some gangster.13
The four basic steps in the logical transmission of truth are instantiated as follows:
Inference (1): (a) Sx = "Every child deserves free education", S2 = "Every child either deserves free education or deserves a free trip to Disneyland". FL= The law saying that whenever a set A is included in a set (in any given universe U), A is included in the union of with any set C (in U).
(60 {(Vx)(Ax 3 fix)} => (Vx)[Ax 3 (Bx V Cx)].
( 2) "Every child deserves free education" logically implies "Every child either deserves free education or deserves a free trip to Dis neyland".
Inference (2) is not empty} is larger than its complement in U.
FL -The law saying that whenever a 2-place relation R in any uni verse U satisfies the condition Cx below it satisfies the condition c2 below, or that the set of relations R on U satis fying the condition c! is included in the set of relations R on U satisfying the condition c2. Where: c! is the condition "{a g U: Range (al R) is larger than its complement} is not empty".
c2 is the condition "{b e U: Dom(R fb) is not empty} is larger than its complement.
(50 {(3x) (My) Rxy} => (My) (3x) Rxy In both examples, the truth of the premise (assuming it is true) is transmitted to the conclusion in virtue of a formal law connecting the re spective situations described by them. Since formal laws, as laws holding in all formally possible states of affairs, have the modal status of formal necessity, so do the consequences based on them.
(iii) The source of the normativity of logic is the truth of the formal laws underlying logical consequences. Any field subject to these laws is subject to the norms based on them. For example, any field subject to the law that an object cannot be in the intersection of a set and its complement (in a given universe) is subject to the logical norm of non-contradiction. physical domain (the former) and the biological domain (the latter).
IV. The Unifying Force of Logic
It is common to think of a theory's pragmatic virtues as divorced from its veridical virtues. In the case of logic, it is common to think that its success as a unifier has nothing to do with its truth, indeed, that it somehow marks it as a discipline for which the question of truth (agreement with reality) does not arise. Logic's pragmatic advantages are connected with its conventional nature, and conventionality rules out truth by correspondence. The idea that unifying power is incompatible with correspondence is, however, illusory. Not only is logic's agreement with reality compatible with its having a considerable unifying power, but its special way of agreeing with reality explains why it has this power. The explanation is straightforward:
1. Logic provides a method of transmitting truth from sentences to sentences based on the formal laws connecting the situations described by these sentences.
2. Formal laws are universally applicable.
3. Therefore, the logical method is universally applicable.
4. A universal method of transmitting truth?i.e., a method of trans mitting truth that applies within and across all fields of knowledge?has a strong unifying effect. This explains why (and how) logic makes a special contribution to the unity of knowledge.
So, logic's unifying power is due to the universality of the logical method, and the universality of the logical method is due to the universality of the formal laws on which it is based, i.e., the laws governing the formal behavior of objects and systems of objects in the world. But it is logic's grounding in these laws that constitutes, according to the explanation given in One way to achieve philosophical economy is by reducing the number of tasks philosophy has to perform. For example, by reducing mathematics to logic we reduce the two tasks of constructing a foundation for logic and constructing a foundation for mathematics to the one task of constructing a foundation for logic. Such an economic gain was promised by Logicism, but its promise did not materialize. Two obstacles that stood in the way (besides the well-known problems with the reduction itself)
were: (i) the scarcity of foundational accounts of logic, (ii) the impossi bility of providing a foundation for logic within a foundational epistemology.
The second obstacle is more serious: by espousing a foundationalist epis temology and placing logic at the bottom of the foundational hierarchy, logicism ruled out a foundation for logic in principle. In contrast, the account of logic in The Bounds of Logic offers a genuine reduction in the tasks of philosophy. This gain is achieved by reversing the direction of the logicist reduction and changing its orienta tion. Instead of reduction of mathematics to logic, it offers a reduction of logic to mathematics (the formal); and instead of a foundationalist reduction, it proposes a holistic reduction. Due to these changes the aforementioned obstacles are removed: a holistic reduction does not bar, in principle, a Sher 1996a Sher ,b, 1999a Sher and 2001 . Henceforth I will use 'The Bounds of Logic" to refer to the book together with the articles.
3. Due to the openness of the model, incorporating the conception of logic in it does not completely obviate its neutrality towards metaphysical and mathematical questions.
4. The purpose of the list is to remind the reader of Quine's main tenets; the principles listed are not mutually independent.
5. As, e.g., in Kant's and Platonists' conceptions of mathematics.
6. While the veridical norms apply only in the synthetic zone, the pragmatic norms apply not only in the analytic zone but also in the synthetic zone. This is due to the special role the analytic zone plays in our system of knowledge. 7. The normative conflict holds even if we find a way to overcome the conceptual conflict. (Such a way is implicitly suggested in the account of the normative conflict itself.) 8. Sentence #4 says that when A and Lr hold, the values of d and 1 are no longer the real numbers m and specified above, the first of which, as we recall, is smaller than the second.
9. The reader may note that on my conception, too, there is a sense in which logic differs from the natural and social sciences. This is correct. The new Quinean model does not claim that all sciences are the same in all ways. What it says is that sciences do not divide into those that are bound only by the pragmatic norms and those that are bound by the veridical norms (as well). Some sciences are more broadly interconnected than others, but all sciences are, in principle, both world-and concept-oriented.
10. See Shapiro (1991) .
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